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ABSTRACT
Recently, after several decades of negotiations, the United States, acting
through the President, opted not to sign the United Nations Law of the Sea
Treaty. In the aftermath of this decision those individuals involved with marine
affairs are beginning to examine the Treaty's separate provisions to ascertain
those which the U.S. may embrace under the auspices of customary international
law. To date, this examination has led to a Presidential Proclamation generating
an Exclusive Economic Zone for the U.S. Jurisdictionally, the next logical step
would be U.S. adoption of the 12 nautical mile limit for its territorial sea.
Indeed, movement in this direction has already begun.
In proclaiming an EEZ for the United States the President, for the first
time in U.S. history, indicated that this Nation would recognize international
claims to a territorial sea in excess of 3 nautical miles to a maximum of 12. In
light of these developments, this thesis examines the history of the U.S.
territorial sea and Federal-State jurisdictional conflicts therein. This
examination is made to determine whether, in this regard, the past will be
prologue to the future.
The central focus of this study then is the domestic impacts likely to
emanate from U.S. adoption of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Further, this
study presents several potential jurisdictional divisions of an expanded territorial
sea as between the coastal States and Federal government, including one option
incorporating the current impetus to create an Outer Continental Shelf revenue
sharing trust fund for these States. The resolution of this potential U.S.
dilemma will be generated through political negotiation and the intent of this
thesis is to clarify the issue and alternative solutions prior to this debate.
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INTRODUCTION
As the U.S. proceedes through the decade of the 1980's there exists a
pervasive sentiment for reducing Federal expenditures. An adjunct to this
budget paring fever is a less obvious re-examination of contemporary notions of
federalism. This scrutiny of the relative role of Federal, State, and local
governments in the coastal zone together with reduced Federal program funding
levels may serve as a catalyst for re-opening the wounds of the somewhat
inappropriately labelled "tidelands controversy."
The crux of the tidelands controversy was a political and juridical
examination of federalism in the coastal zone. Though the political pre-
eminence of this controversy peaked during and shortly after the 1952
Presidential elections juridical interpretations of federalism in the coastal zone
have spanned half a century and continue to date.
At issue in the original tidelands controversy were ownership rights to the
mineral resources of portions of the continental shelf of the U.S. Though there
were some early vacillations, the U.S. Federal government came to claim these
resources from the shoreline to the edge of the continental shelf and, quite
recently, to within 200 nautical miles of the U.S. coast. In contradistinction, the
coastal States claimed, at a minimum, rights to the mineral resources of the
continental shelf within the territorial sea.
In an historic decision the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in 1947, in favor of
the Federal government as against the State of California regarding the requisite
legal authority to lease offshore hydrocarbon development. The political fall-out
from this decision can be shown to have influenced the 1952 Presidential
elections and in turn led to enactment of the SUbmerged Lands Act which
granted ownership rights to the mineral resources of the continental shelf from
the shore to 3 nautical miles to coastal States.
Though modifications in subsequent statutes have further enhanced State's
rights in the Outer Continental Shelf area, this grant of 3 nautical miles to
coastal States, with the exceptions of Florida and Texas in the Gulf of Mexico,
has remained intact. The 3 nautical mile grant is inextricably tied to what in the
past has been deemed the breadth of the territorial sea. This limit to the
territorial sea has for some time now been under challenge from the
international community of coastal nations. One can argue, in fact, that the
contemporary limit for the breadth of the territorial sea has, through customary
international law, become 12 nautical miles.
It is, therefore, a combination of changes in the contemporary
international conception of the legal territorial sea breadth together with
critical domestic reappraisal of federalism in the coastal zone which may lend
credence to future coastal State claims to expanded jurisdiction over continental
shelf resources• . Thus, the re-opening of the tidelands controversy.
In anticipation of serious debate concerning expansion of the U.S.
territorial sea and its political division within our federal system of government
this thesis will broadly examine the relevant issues. The following discussion will
focus on the history and current status of limits to the territorial sea, the
evolution of Federal/State jurisdiction over the territorial sea, and on
alternative jurisdictional divisions of a hypothetical 12 nautical mile United
States territorial sea.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF
LIMITS TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA
From the time of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Dutch jurists
Grotius and Bynkershoeck it has been generally accepted that a coastal nation's
sovereignty extends beyond its shores to a belt of marginal waters known as the
territorial sea. The exact legal limit to territorial sea claims of coastal nations
has not enjoyed such widespread recognition. Despite numerous international
conferences intended to settle the discrepancies in the breadth of claims to a
territorial sea, among other related marine matters, there is still no
international declaratory rule governing such extensions of national sovereignty
into the sea. Provisions for such a rule, however, are contained in the Treaty of
the recently concluded Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. Among
other provisions, this Treaty provides for a maximum extension of the territorial
sea to 12 nautical miles (n.rn.).
Origin and historical breadth of the territorial sea.
While the extent of the territorial sea has never enjoyed absolute
international consensus, the prevailing claim prior to World War II was 3n.m.,
traditionally called the "cannon-shot" rule. Bynkershoeck's early Eighteenth
Century writings gave validity to the belief that a coastal nation was entitled to
a belt of waters adjacent to its shores that could be defended from land. A
contemporary of Bynkershoek's, Italian jurist Galiani, is credited with equating
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the cannon-shot rule with three nautical miles. This limit was the equivalent of a
marine league, a common measure of nautical distance during that period. It
should be noted, however, that the range of a coastal cannon during the days of
Bynkershoek and Galiani was considerably less than a marine league)
Though the 3n.m. territorial sea achieved stature among some maritime
nations, it was not the universal limit prior to World War II. Another standard of
measurement was the line of sight rule, or the distance one could see from land,
which understandably produced a wide variety of claims.2
In the United States, early adoption of the 3n.m. rule is often traced to
correspondence between then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and the
French and British ministers concerning the establishment of a "neutrality zone"
adjacent to U.S. shores. Jefferson tentatively established this zone as extending
one marine league from U.S. coasts. Shortly after his note was sent to the
British and French ministers, the U.S. Congress officially recognized the breadth
of the "neutrality zone" as one marine league) It should be noted, however,
that this zone did not establish a territorial sea with all it concomitant rights
and duties, but instead established a "neutrality zone" solely for the purposes of
national defense and maritime commerce.
The territorial sea of the U.S. was first registered in international affairs
in the form of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain following
the War of 1812. In order to maximize access to the fisheries off Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland, the U.S. sought to limit the breadth of the territorial sea to
3n.m.4
Prior to and following this treaty, the United States proposed or made
jurisdictional claims of disparate breadth for a variety of purposes. Among these
varied claims were: (1) a neutrality zone extending to the Gulf Stream,
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advocated by then President Jefferson; (2) customs jurisdiction to four marine
leagues, adopted by Congressional action in 1799, and extended to 62 miles in
1935; (3) enforcement of Prohibition legislation to four marine leagues in 1922;
(4) a distance of one hour's travel from the U.S. coast, as established by the
"Liquor Treaty" of 1924 between the U.S. and Great Britain, to constrain
smuggling during Prohibition; (5) a security zone reaching several hundred miles
from the shores of the American Republics at the beginning of World War II; and
(6) air defense identification zones, after World War II, which required
notification within two hours cruising distance of U.S. shores.v During the
Roosevelt Administration several intitiatives were undertaken to expand the U.S.
territorial sea. Roosevelt himself favored ridding the U.S. of the shackles of the
3n.m. territorial sea and replacing it with one of "common sense," as did an
interdepartmental group appointed by Roosevelt to study this and other marine
resource jurisdicitional issues.v Because of the war and Roosevelt's untimely
death nothing came of these initiatives within his administration.
While U.S. claims to special purpose zones of jurisdiction have had a varied
history, offshore territorial sovereignty claims have been held to 3n.m. Because
of the varied claims of other coastal nations, however, the U.S. has participated
in numerous international conferences with a view to establishing a universal
limit for territorial sea claims.
One of the earliest international efforts to establish such a limit was the
Conference for the Codification of International Law, sponsored by the League
of Nations in 1930. In response to queries by the Preparatory Committee,
coastal nations promulgated their views on the territorial sea. The United States
held that the only limit achieving anything close to consensus was 3n.m.7 The
responses of other coastal nations varied, and the 1930 Conference resulted in no
universal limit by general acceptance.
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Shortly after its establishment, in 1945, the United Nations requested that
the International Law Commission begin an extensive review of sea law, in
particular the limits of the territorial sea and jurisdictional regimes for marine
resources. The Commission's final report, released in 1956, while not resolving
the issue of limits to the breadth of the territorial sea gave rise to a United
Nations conference that attempted to standardize international sea law.
This First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
was convened in 1958 at Geneva, Switzerland. It met with some success,
producing four Conventions dealing with the continental shelf, the territorial sea
and the contiguous zone, the high seas, and fisheries and other living resources of
the high seas. It was, however, unable to settle the issue of limits to the
territorial sea. While these Conventions have gained juridical standing,
particularly before the International Court of Justice, they have been widely
derided for their lack of clarity on limits to the territorial sea and continental
shelf.8
In 1960 the United Nations convened the Second U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 11), to again address the issues of limits to the
territorial sea and continental shelf. This Conference met with less success than
its predecessor, and subsequently the various Conventions created by UNCLOS I
went into effect during the years 1962-1968. They remain the primary
international treaties governing the law of the sea, pending ratification and
entry into force of the UNCLOS III Treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions did not put a stop to the process of creeping
jurisdiction, and claims to ocean space have since proliferated. Loopholes in
these Conventions in essence opened the door for the continued seaward creep of
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jurisdiction, and new and broader claims established the threat of restriction of
commercial and military ocean vessel movement through vital straits around the
world. Additionally, technological advances have made it clear that resource
exploitation would become increasingly feasible even at distances far from
coastal areas.
Following UNCLOS II, in 1967-1968, the United Nations established a
Seabeds Committee to examine disputed issues regarding ocean mining and other
related marine affairs. In recognition of numerous proposals to extend the limt
to the territorial sea, President Nixon issued a "Statement About United States
Ocean Policy" on May 23, 1970, in which he, among other initiatives, proposed
adoption of a coupled agreement on the l Zn.rn, territorial sea limit and
provisions for free transit through and over international straits. President
Nixon referred these proposals to the U.N. Seabeds Committee and urged
resolution of these and other marine issues via a new law of the sea treaty.9
President Nixon's 1970 Ocean Policy Statements received the endorsement
of the U.S. House of Representatives in Resolution 330, on April 2, 1973.10 This
resolution exhibited Congressional support for the l Zn.m, territorial sea limit.
The U.S. Senate passed Resolution 82 on July 9, 1973, for similar purposes) 1
Although the U.S. had, through its President and Congress, endorsed the
concept of a LZn.rn. territorial sea, its adoption was contingent on a transit
passage regime. In March 1983, President Reagan in issuing his Exclusive
Economic Zone Proclamation and ocean policy guidelines, for the first time in
U.S. history, indicated that the U.S. will recognize claims to a territorial sea in
excess of 3n.m. to a maximum of 12n.m. by those nations according the U.S. its
full rights under international law in their territorial sea) 2 The materials
accompanying the U.S. EEZ Proclamation made clear that these full rights
included those of the transit passage regime.
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The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
was convened in December of 1973 in New York. In the ten years since, the
delegates to the world's largest international treaty-making effort have failed to
reach a consensus on the entire UNCLOS III Treaty. While a consensus has been
achieved on a majority of the provisions of the Treaty, those dealing with
exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed beyond the bounds of national
jurisidiction have proven difficult to resolve. The UNCLOS III Treaty was
opened for signature of participating nations in Montego Bay, Jamaica during
December 1982. Within a matter of weeks of this momentous event well over
100 nations had signed the final act of UNCLOS III, indicating a broad base of
support for this often touted "package deal."
On July 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that the U.S. would not sign
the treaty because of objections to provisions for deep seabed mining and future
amendments to the treaty which could be adopted without U.S. approval. 13 The
interagency review which led to this decision did not make public any
reservations concerning provisions of the UNCLOS III Treaty for a l Zn.m,
territorial sea. For the remainder of the Reagan Administration, and likely for
some time following unless substantial progress is made in the Preparatory
Commission set up by the Treaty, or outside of the Commission by the Treaty
delegates themselves, the U.S. will not be a party to this effort to codify
international sea law. This is not to say, however, that the U.S. may not
embrace relevant portions of the UNCLOS III Treaty which it finds beneficial
and which it feels are assertable under customary international law, as witnessed
by the recent U.S. EEZ Proclamation. In lieu of U.S. ratification of this Treaty,
several options for domestic implementation of select provisions remain. These
options, as well as the basis for their legality, will be reviewed in a subsequent
portion of this paper.
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Rights and duties of a sovereign power in the territorial sea.
Within the territorial sea a sovereign power retains all rights that it can
lawfully assert on its land, subject only to the right of ships of all nations to
innocent passage as defined by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone.l 4 The irrevocable right of innocent passage is a
concession granted by the coastal nation through whose territorial sea a ship
transverses providing such passage complies with the applicable principles of
international law. In other words, a coastal nation exerts sovereignty over the
territorial sea. The sovereignty of each nation extends to the air space above,
and submerged lands underlying, the territorial sea.l 5
As alluded to earlier, the establishment of the right of a coastal nation to a
territorial sea arose largely from recognition that in order to control its
sovereign property a nation must be able to control ingress to and egress from
that property. This recognition was based upon the customary right of a nation
to militarily police its property. Economic considerations, however, grew in
relative importance as nations matured and their commercial interdependencies
were fashioned. With the rise in international commerce control of the
territorial sea became more important for the purposes of protecting coastwise
trade and preventing, smuggling and piracy.
A further adjunct to a coastal nation's interests in maritime commerce was
the generally recognized right of that nation to exclusively enjoy the fruits of
resource exploitation within the territorial sea. Until the advent of the
petroleum-powered engine this virtually meant the right to exclusively harvest
the fishery resources of this zone. This right stems from the view of the
territorial sea as an extension of a coastal nation's sovereign holdings.
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With the rise in the commercial feasibility of exploiting the hydrocarbon
resources underlying the seabed, however, the extent of a coastal nation's claim
to a territorial sea gained in importance. This was further aggravated by the
developed countries' increasing ability to send commercial fishing fleets further
and further from their home bases in search of selected fisheries such as whales,
salmon, and tunas. These developments gained in importance in the period
immediately preceeding and post-dating World War II.
Within this period the Truman Proclamations on the Continental Shelf and
on Coastal Fisheries were issued - in 1945, to be precise. These proclamations
were actually the promulgation of a U.S. foreign policy conceived and drafted
under the preceeding Roosevelt Administration.l 6 In the eyes of many, the
Truman Proclamations set the stage for an era of creeping jurisdiction.
Numerous coastal nations, most immediately the South and Latin American
nations of Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, used the Truman
Proclamations as a basis for the seaward march of their claims. Several of these
claims used the .Proclamations as a basis for justifying territorial claims of up to
200 nautical miles.
The heightened interest in expanding marine territorial claims brought
about by the Truman Proclamations generated, particularly on behalf of the U.S.
and other developed countries, a desire to codify internationally acceptable
limits to seaward territorial claims. As briefly touched on above, efforts were
made in 1947, with the establishment of the International Law Commission OLC)
in the U.N., to define a codifiable limit for territorial sea claims. The ILC
served as a preparatory commission for the 1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), held in Geneva, Switzerland. In its 1956 report, the members
of the ILC were unable to come to agreement on a limit to territorial sea claims
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between 3 and 12 nautical miles. Although agreement could not be reached
between these bounds the ILC did state that, "•.•international law does not
permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles." 1?
World-wide review of territorial sea claims.
Table 1 presents a chronological view of national claims to a territorial sea
from the 1958 UNCLOS to the present. Figure 1 plots the changing claims by
coastal nations to territorial sea widths of varying extent as a function of time.
Even a casual perusal of Table 1 and Figure 1 will indicate that in the 25
years since the 1958 Geneva Conventions were signed international claims to a
12n.m. territorial sea have grown in greater proportion than has the number of
independent coastal nations, even assuming that all new coastal nations adopted
this limit. As Robert Smith has noted, of all European nations only Albania,
which claims a 15n.m. territorial sea, claims more than 12n.m.l8 Further,
world-wide claims greater than l Zn.rn, for a territorial sea are located in the
developing countries of Africa and Central and South America. Smith attributes
these claims to the desire of these nations to protect their economic interests in
these areas of ocean space against the developed nations and neighboring
countries. Following ratification of the UNCLOS III Treaty many nations with
claims greater than l Zn.rn. for their territorial sea are expected to conform to
this new internationally accepted limit.
As of 1982, over half of the independent coastal nations of the world had
laid claim to a 12n.m. territorial sea. Moreover, in the 25 years since the 1958
Geneva Conventions were signed the ratio of nations claiming a 3n.m. versus a
12n.m. territorial sea has shifted from 5/1 to less than 1/3. Some credence then
may be given to the observation that an international consensus, if not custom,
has arisen concerning the legality of claims to a 12n.m. territorial sea.
n
TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS
(n.rn.) 1958 1972 1979 1981 1982
3 45 34 23 21 23
4 4 4 3 3 2
5 1
6 12 12 4 4 4
9 1
10 1 1
12 9 53 76 80 78
15 1 1 1
18 1
20 1 1 1
25 1
30 1 2 2 2
35 1
50 1 4 4 4
70 1 1 1
100 1 1 1
130 1
150 1 1 1
200 2 9 14 14 14
Rectangular/
Polygonal 3 2 3
No Legislation 5 2 1 1
Total Coastal
Nations: 80 121 135 135 137
Source: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State.
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FIGURE 1. INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL SEA
CLAIMS 1958 -1982
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International law and the standing of the 12n.m. territorial sea.
With the recent opening of the UNCLOS Treaty for signature, and the
growing international consensus on the 12n.m. territorial sea, it may be
instructive to examine the standing of this territorial limit in international law.
As the world becomes more and more complexly intertwined nations have tended
to, in cases short of war, rely on the legal foundation of their territorial claims
more than on their ability to unilaterally force these claims upon other nations.
International law is defined as the , ".•.body of principles, customs, and
rules that are recognized as effectively binding obligations by sovereign states
and other international persons in their mutual relations." 19 International law
has evolved as have the extent and scope of international relations. In
international relations most nations place a premium on stability and
predictability in the pursuit of national objectives and on having a means of
peaceful dispute resolution. Despite its numerous shortcomings international law
provides these benefits on a daily basis.
An authoritative reference for the sources of international law has been
established in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
This article directs the court, in cases it examines, to apply, 11(1) international
conventions (treaties), whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contestant states; (2) international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; and (4) subject to the provisions of Article 59 (ICJ Statute),
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."20
14
The claims of coastal nations to marine sovereignty would most soundly be
based upon conventional or customary law. As has been brought out above,
numerous attempts have been made to codify international sea law through such
fora as the League of Nations, beginning as early as 1930, and later the United
Nations. It has only been within the past year, over a half century later, that
such a codification has seemed imminent. Should it enter into force the
UNCLOS III Treaty will affect all nations coastal and land-locked. Though over
100 eligible participants have signed the final act of UNCLOS III, the Treaty will
not enter into force until one year after 60 nations have ratified it. That it will
enter into force is by no means a certainty, but it does seem highly probable
given this initial base of support.
Not all nations will ratify or be bound by the UNCLOS Treaty in its
entirety. A treaty is binding only on participating nations, as long as those
nations objecting to it publicly maintain their refusal to be bound by it. A treaty
is also binding upon new members of the community of nations, entering therein
after the treaty's effective date.
It seems probable that at least in the near-term the U.S. will not be
participating in these most recent efforts to codify international sea law,
primarily because of objections to deep seabed mining provisions. There has
been widespread discontent, both domestically and among representatives of
many foreign nations, with the U.S. decision to withdraw from future
participation in this treaty-making effort. The basis of this discontent rests
primarily upon the view that as a major power the U.S. bears a significant
responsibility to ensure that multilateral negotiations continue to be a prime
source of international law. Without U.S. support for this mode of peaceful
conduct less responsible nations may be disposed toward similar unilateralism
with its inherent potential for discord and conflict.
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This discontent aside, a question remains as to what portions of the
UNCLOS III Treaty have already achieved the status of customary international
law. For those nations, such as the U.S., who do not accede to the UNCLOS
Treaty as a whole, certain provisions will still remain attractive, and assertable
as customary international law. Two primary indicators of the achievement of
customary international law by a proposed rule of law are the extent of its
practice and the longevity of its use. The l Zn.m , territorial sea, as evidenced by
the practice of coastal nations, may have evolved during the past 30 years to this
stature. With or without the UNCLOS III Treaty it would seem well within the
bounds of accepted international behavior to assert a claim to a 12n.m.
territorial sea. Without the UNCLOS III Treaty, however, the acceptability of
the transit passage regime so desired by commercial and military interests may
have to rely on the success of bilateral negotiations.
Domestic impacts of a U.S. l Zn.rn, territorial sea.
It seems clear then that should the U.S. assert its right to establish a l Zn.rn,
territorial sea there would be little legal opposition by other nations of the
world. In fact, such a move would probably be welcomed by most nations as it
would help to crystalize international sea law pertaining to the territorial sea.
United States adoption of this limit, together with bilateral straits access
negotiations which would surely ensue without U.S. accession to the UNCLOS III
Treaty, will also help to bring the transit passage provisions of the Treaty into
more general acceptance. Assertion of a 12n.m. territorial sea would also add to
the international pressure on those coastal nations with claims beyond this limit
to roll back such claims and bring uniformity and predictability to the seaward
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limits to national sovereignty. Continued U.S. refusal to recognize the l2n.m.
territorial sea claims of other nations, on the other hand, would have been
extremely costly. In view of the pervasiveness of this claim, valuable poll tical
capital would have been lost to the U.S. by such intransigence.
Should the U.S. adopt the l Zn.rn. territorial sea limit, either eventually
under the auspices of the UNCLOS III Treaty or unilaterally, there would
undoubtedly be some impacts. The predominant number of these impacts would
be domestic in nature. Internationally, such a move would generate mostly
positive impacts as indicated above.
United States embrace of the l Zn.rn, limit would shore up international
applicability of domestic marine pollution laws and would expand the buffer
surrounding the U.S. through which any foreign rnili tary activities would be
constrained. The single most important domestic impact, however, would be
that on Federal/State relations. Such a move should be expected to generate the
immediate interest of State governments.
As detailed in the next chapter of this study, a long history of disputes
exists between coastal States and the Federal goverment over ownership of the
submerged lands adjacent to U.S. shores. Following Congressional enactment of
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 coastal State jurisdiction in the U.S.
was judicially establlshed as extending 3n.m. from the low tide shorel ine - except
in Texas and Florida, which in the Gulf of Mexico were granted 3 marine leagues.
Subsequent judicial decisions were consonant with the official U.S. position
regarding seaward limits to national soveretgnty.Zl Congressional enactment of
the Submerged Lands Act reflected recognition that coastal States did have
legitimate interests beyond their shorelines. The 3n.m. limit to these grants
corresponded to the extant Iirnlt of national sovereignty in the sea. Had the U.S.
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territorial sea at that time been broader so might have been the State grants.
Regardless, the controversy surrounding Federal versus State seabed has been
extremely heated and has spanned more than 35 years.
With U.S. adoption of a 12n.m. territorial sea, the ownership rights to the
seabed and management authority within that limit, may again become the
subject of controversy between the Federal and State governments.
Concomitantly, the ultimate direction of revenue flows from resource
development in the 3-12n.m. zone would be subject to dispute. This later
domestic impact of the l Zn.rn. limit is the most immediately chilling as the
uncertaintly generated by such a dispute could affect both the rate and
magnitude of resource development by private industry due to lack of legal
clarity to title in leases or permits. Further, the revenue flow dispute will
become increasingly more important in the face of mounting deficits at both the
Federal and State levels.
A last attendant impact of a Federal-State dispute over rights in an
expanded territorial sea will be legal-managerial in nature. That level of
government which gains jurisdiction over the additional 9n.m. of ocean space and
seabed will incur regulatory and compliance/enforcement costs. Unless the
victor is prepared to assume these responsibilities, ultimately it will be the
resource management programs which will suffer, and indirectly so will the
public in whose benefit these programs are conducted.
Responsible public policy would dictate that such impacts as are described
above be anticipated and addressed prior to their onset. A host of natural
reso.urces lay within the l Zn.rn, zone, most of which are identified below, and for
the Nation to receive maximum benefit from these public lands management
must be reasoned.
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Marine resources of the 12n.m. U.S. territorial sea.
The offshore regions of the U.S. and the resources contained therein are
managed by governmental entities for the public's benefit as a common property
resource. Under the current division, State authority ends and Federal authority
begins for resource management at the 3n.m. limit - excluding the Gulf of
Mexico wherein this authority relative to Florida and Texas changes hands at 3
marine leagues. It is undoubtedly obvious to all that political divisions such as
boundaries are made with no regard for resource distributions. The
establishment of a political boundary in the middle of a resource range creates
the currently realized potential for lack of coordination, and often direction, in
the resource management lntlatives of the participating political entities. Under
a federal system of government this seems inescapable but should be minimized
to ensure that the public benefit is realized from the development of these
offshore resources.
Because of its reduced accessibility resource and reserve estimates for the
ocean space subject to U.S. and State jurisdiction are more limited than are their
onshore counterparts. Within the 3-l2n.m. zone, which is subject to dispute
should the U.S. adopt the 12n.m. territorial sea, are several known resources of
immense value. This study will identify these resources. If this dispute
materializes, however, it will become critical to quantify them so that an
estimation may be made as to the effect of changes on revenue flows to either
State or Federal treasuries and on their respective management capabilities.
The two most readily identifiable resources within the 3-12n.m. zone are
fisheries and the hydrocarbons underlying the submerged lands. From a revenue
perspective fisheries present little problem as the prime Federal objectives in
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fisheries management are conservation of the resource, industrial development,
and foreign access control. Further, over 50 and 60 per cent of the monetary
value and weight, respectively, of U.S. commercial fisheries are landed within
3n.m. of the coast.22 Data collected by the National Marine Fisheries Service is
not readily amenable to division at the l Zn.m. limit. The magnitude of these
numbers, as well as the realization that costs and perishability of product serve
as restraining factors to fishing far from shore, serve to illustrate the point that
the bulk of commercial fishing will occur within 12n.m. of the coast and
therefore be subject to the government gaining jurisdiction in an expanded
territorial sea. Extension of State authority in this zone would bring the range
of many commercial species completely under their control.
Offshore hydrocarbon development is substantially different from
commercial fishing in one important aspect - that is, the revenue it generates to
governments through rents, royalties, bonuses, and taxes. Currently, and
historically, the only OCS regions under production are those adjacent to
Louisiana, Texas, and California. Only the OCS is examined here because that is
the area from which the expansion in the territorial sea would be derived. In
1981 alone, these OCS regions generated more than 76 per cent of the total,
approximately $3.3 billion, of royalties paid to the Federal government.23 Over
the period 1953-1981, during which OCS leases have been let, royalties paid to
the Federal government have amounted to approximately $13.5 billion.24 Though
a portion of these revenues are diverted to the Land and Water Conservation
Fund ($866 million in FY 1981), and the Historic Preservation Fund ($150 million
in FY 1981), which directly benefit the States, the remainder of mineral leasing
rents, bonuses, and royalty revenues are deposited into the general treasury and
by 1990 will represent the second largest annual deposit next to Federal income
taxes.2 5
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Again, the data on offshore hydrocarbon development is not readily
amenable to division at the l2n.m. limit. As opposed to fisheries, though,
hydrocarbon exploration and development/production is occuring increasingly
further from shore. Based on historical record, modification of the territorial
sea limit from 3-l2n.m. can be predicted to have a regionally diverse impact.
Looking at production on the OCS (3n.m. seaward), from which the additional
9n.m. will be subtracted, the Gulf of Mexico oil and condensate production has
varied dur ing the past 28 years from lOO - 94 per cent of national OCS
production. Similarly, production of gas from the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico
over the past 28 years has varied from lOO - 99.4 per cent.26 It should be noted
here that all current OCS production in the Gulf of Mexico comes from the
Texas and Louisiana offshore, and primarily the latter. As the Alaskan offshore
matures, and with recent "giant" field discoveries offshore California, these
figures will likely decline but, it remains clear that certain regions of the U.S.
would benefit more than others from an expansion of the territorial sea.
While fisheries and offshore hydrocarbons are presently the primary marine
resources under development technological advances coupled with increased
demand, and exhaustion of onshore, domestic reserves will create greater
incentives to develop the offshore hard mineral resources adjacent to the U.S.
Many of these resources have been identified within the l2n.m. zone. In the past
both sulfur and salt have been produced near-shore in the Gulf of Mexico. Sand,
gravel, and carbonate, used for construction aggregate and beach replenishment,
are found in many areas around the U.S. coastal belt. Dredging for these
materials has occurred in the New York Bight and San Francisco Bay. Near-term
development of these resources is likely to accompany offshore hydrocarbon
activities in the Beaufort Sea and in coastal waters adjacent to major
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metropolitan areas where the costs of transportation, or alternatives, becomes
prohibitive for such basic building materials.
Industrial interest has been expressed on other offshore hard minerals such
as phosphorites in the Southeast Atlantic margin and offshore California.
Though not as near-term other coastally-Iocated hard minerals potentially
extractable under more favorable economic conditions, and following more
reserve definition cruises, include placer gold, platinum, tin, titanium, iron, and
chromite.27
Because commercial interest, to date, has been rather low for the offshore
hard minerals there is as yet no governmental leasing system in place. However,
the development of these resources seems highly likely in the not too distant
future. Together with the hydrocarbon and fisheries resources it can be seen
that there exists, and is in place, a great potential for significant revenues
derivable by the governmental unit with jurisdiction from marine resource
development. While the change and increase in this flow is extremely difficult
to predict, their magnitude seems certain to provide incentive to both the coastal
States and Federal governments to exert jurisdicition over the additional 9n.m.
should the U.S. assert its right to a 12n.m. territorial sea.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL/STATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Witliin this chapter an attempt is made to give the reader a sense of how
jurisdiction over the territorial sea within the United States evolved, and is still
evolving, and of the political magnitude of the "tidelands controversy" during
that period in history. An intentionally large portion of the text addresses
political aspects of this controversy because of the bearing this will have should
the U.S. decide to assert its right to a 12n.m. territorial sea. The likelihood is
quite strong that should the U.S. make such a move the "tidelands controversy"
would rekindle itself, particularly in light of the valuable resources currently and
potentially extractable within this zone.
Events leading to U.S. ~ California I and other pre-SLA cases.
For approximately the first 150 years of the American Republic the issue
of offshore jurisdiction as between the coastal States and Federal government
was a non-issue. The Federal government had continually exercised its rights in
the fields of international relations, commerce, defense, and navigation. The
coastal States had, based upon testimony in several subsequent legal proceedings,
continuously believed that they had ownership rights in the resources of the
navigable waters, and submerged lands, adjacent to and within their lands.
Resolve of jurisdictional issues is frequently precipitated by
industrial or private interest in territory, or resources contained therein, thereby
requiring clarification of legal title. Such was the situation leading to a series of
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lawsuits between the Federal government and coastal States to resolve
ownership and management rights within the territorial sea. This series of
lawsuits became known as the "Submerged Lands Cases." The litigation of these
cases commenced in 1945 with initiation by the Federal government of an action
against the State of California within the Supreme Court. This case was entitled
U.S. v California.
Events prior to U.S. v California.
Prospects for developing the hydrocarbon resources underlying the seabed
began to evolve around the turn of the century in California. Through
directional drilling from land-based operations, oil was developed from offshore
fields and fields beneath the land-water interface. Gradually developers erected
offshore platforms connected to shore by boardwalks and piers. At this point in
time these activities were conducted largely unfettered of governmental
regulation. In 1921, however, the State of California enacted a general leasing
statute under which leases extending into the territorial sea were issued and
royalties were collected. Heavy offshore development in California commenced
around 1928 and by 1940 wells were being drilled in 60 feet of water .28 From
1929 to 1938 there was no new general leasing by California for submerged lands.
Due to the obvious hydrocarbon potential and insecurity as to the legal
title to leases being issued by California, several applications. were made to the
U.S. Department of the Interior under the framework of the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act during this period. Then Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, until
mid-1937, denied the Federal government's right to issue leases within the
territorial sea directly stating that the title to these proposed California leases
resided with the State.29
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By mid-1937, however, with the magnitude of the resources offshore
California becoming clearer, and similar resources being identified in the Gulf of
Mexico and the Bahamas, Secretary Ickes began to shift his stance. Ickes
supported a bill sponsored by Senator Nye (S. 2164), in the 75th Congress to
assert Federal jurisdiction over petroleum resources under submerged lands
around the Nation.30 This bill, which subsequently became a Senate Resolution
(Senate Joint Resolution 208), passed the Senate in August 1937, but did not pass
the House. This resolution would have directed the Attorney General to take
action to establish U.S. possession of these resources had it been enacted. With
the introduction of this and similar legislation in the 76th Congress, Interior
began to suspend decisions on lease applications and to cease denying Federal
jurisdiction over SUbmerged lands) 1
In response to these actions to usurp authority which the coastal States had
long believed legally resided with them a series of events was precipitated; in
1938 Louisiana extended its seaward State boundary 24n.m. from the extant
3n.m. boundary; California resumed leasing offshore rights in 1939; and Texas
extended its seaward boundary)2 These responses created great concern in the
Executive branch and particularly Secretary Ickes. Roosevelt established an
interdepartmental study group to examine the issue, and the seaward extent of
Federal jurisdicition, and present recommendations. The Interdepartmental
Committee to Study Title to Submerged Oil Lands reported to President
Roosevelt in 1940, recommending judicial action to resolve the dispute between
the Federal government and coastal States. However, the impending elections
and the emotionalism of State's rights issues caused Roosevelt to put this issue
on the back burner. His opponent in the 1940 election, Wendell Wilkie, had
adopted a position favoring the coastal States.33
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Following Roosevelt's re-election the issue of territorial sea rights subsided
as the war grew in importance. Executive branch study was made of this issue
during Roosevelt's last full term but, the general conclusions were that it would
be better to proceed legislatively to resolve the issue. When Roosevelt died in
April 1945 his Vice-President, Truman, took office. Shortly thereafter, the
famous Truman Proclamations were promulgated. As previously mentioned,
these Proclamations were actually conceived and drafted during the Roosevelt
Administration. Proclamation No. 2668 asserted jurisdicition and control over
the mineral resources of the continental shelf of the U.S. Executive Order No.
9633, issued the same day, gave administrative custody of these resources to the
Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, with the disclaimer that the
Proclamation did in no way affect the continuing tidelands controversy.V'
In May of 1945, barely a month after assuming the Presidency, Truman
instructed the Attorney General to initiate a suit in the District Court of
California to test California's ability to issue offshore leases. Five months later,
in October 1945, Truman further instructed Attorney General Clark to file an
original suit against the State of California in the Supreme COllr ":.35
While the Supreme Court considered this case the 79th Congress had passed
House Joint Resolution 225, to transfer title to the submerged lands of the
territorial sea to the adjacent States. Truman, however, vetoed this bill and was
able to sustain his veto in the House of Representatives during an August 194-6
vote)6 Partially in response to this veto the State of Texas extended her
seaward boundary to the edge of the continental shelf)7
A major turning point in the tidelands controversy occurred in June 194-7
when the Supreme Court returned its verdict in U.S. v California - No. 12
Original. This ruling asserted that the U.S., and not the coastal States, had
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"paramount rights" in the territorial sea and submerged lands by virtue of
sovereignty in external affairs of the Nation)8
u.s. v California and other pre-SLA cases.
As detailed above President Truman initiated U.S. v California in the
Supreme Court in October 1945. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution was invoked by the U.S. Federal
government in this suit against California (No. 12 Original). The basis of the suit
was the unresolved U.S. claim to all submerged lands within 3n.m. of the
coastline of the U.S. The suit was initiated as a test case and to enjoin further
trespass on these lands by the State of California or its lessees.
In answer to this complaint the State of California admitted that it had
authorized leases for petroleum extraction from a 3n.m. belt of ocean adjacent
to its shores:
"The basis of California's asserted ownership (was) that a belt extending three
English miles from the low water mark lies within the original boundaries of the
State, Cal. Const., 1849, Art. XII; that the original thirteen states acquired from
the Crown of England title to all lands within their boundaries under navigable
waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas; and that since California
was admitted as a state on an 'equal footing' with the original states, California
at that time became vested with title to all such lands.,,39
Prior to U.S. ~ California the law of submerged lands was composed of two
primary cases - Martin ~ The Lessee of Wadell (1842), and Pollard's Lessee ~
Hagan (1846). Both the "Martin" and "Pollard" cases determined State's rights in
the submerged lands underlying "navigable waters" within each State's territorial
limits. While the courts did not specifically address the application of these
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cases to the territorial sea many believed them to be equally applicable there.
As it became known the Pollard inland water rule was applied and re-affirmed by
courts for the next century. The first real challenge to this rule came when
application was made to the submerged lands of the territorial sea.
Following dismissal of several attempts by California's representatives to
void the suit on technical grounds Justice Black delivered the majority opinion of
the Court. The Court found that California's claim to submerged lands
underlying the territorial sea was without merit. The Supreme Court noted that,
in their opinion, the Pollard rule did not apply to the submerged lands of the
territorial sea. Therefore, California had no rights to title for these lands or for
leasing hydrocarbon development therein and that the U.S. was, and had been,
possessed of paramount rights in the territorial sea beyond inland waters. The
Court further noted that though California was admitted to the Union on an
"equal footing" none of the original thirteen colonies had acquired ownership of
the 3n.m. territorial sea even though they had acquired elements of sovereignty
by their successful revolt against the English Crown. The Court argued that at
the birth of our Nation the 3n.m. territorial sea was but a "nebulous suggestion"
and not a settled international custom. 40 The Supreme Court's decree was
entered on October 27, 1947 (332 U.S. 804).
Though the Federal government had won this test case on territorial sea
rights its difficulties were not over. When it became clear that California's
request for a new hearing would be denied applications from industry under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 again began to be received by the Interior
Department. It soon became clear, however, that though the U.S. had won its
battle against California it still had no statutory authority to lease hydrocarbon
development rights. 41
28
Because of the political volatility of the issue the Truman Administration
was unable to gain the statutory authority it needed to begin offshore leasing.42
However, to consolidate its position the Federal government instituted legal
proceedings against the States of Louisiana and Texas on grounds similar to the
California case. In a jointly issued decree the Supreme Court, in 1950,
reaffirmed its decision in the earlier California case ruling that these two States
had no property rights in the submerged lands of the territorial sea.43 Both of
these cases again limited the application of the Pollard rule to inland waters. It
should be noted that neither of the preceeding cases or _U.S. v California
attempted to settle the location of any State's boundaries.
These three cases - U.S. ~ California (1947), U.S. ~ Louisiana (1950), and
U.S. ~ Texas (1950), comprise what are referred to as the "Submerged Lands
Cases." As perhaps can be imagined, the rulings in these cases were extremely
unpopular with coastal States and the "tidelands controversy" grew further in
stature into a significant political issue.
Political magnitude of the "tidelands controversy,"
A sense of the political magnitude of the "tidelands controversy" can
perhaps be gleaned from the preceding discussion on the evolution of the
submerged lands cases. As was pointed out this issue entered national election
politics as early as 1940 in the Roosevelt-Wilkie Presidential race. Though urged
otherwise by his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, Roosevelt, in 1940, set
aside the problem of resolving ownership rights in the territorial sea because of
the impending election and because the "tidelands controversy" had become a
State's rights issue in coastal States and within the Republican party.
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Following the Federal government's victories in the Supreme Court as
against the States of California, Texas, and Louisiana it became clear that the
Executive branch did not have the authority to issue leases on the submerged
lands of the territorial sea or further out on the continental shelf. All revenues
generated from development on existing leases had to be held in escrow pending
final resolution of the issue. The royalties being generated were significant,
particularly from the States' perspective.
During the period 1946-1952 the Executive and Legislative branches of the
Federal government were unable to reach agreement on ownership or
administration of the submerged lands. Twice, once in 1946 and again in 1952,
President Truman vetoed quitclaim legislation passed by Congress which would
have reasserted ownership of the submerged lands of the territorial sea for
coastal States. Though successful in sustaining his veto Truman was unable to
garner sufficient support for Federal offshore leasing authorization. By the time
of the 1952 Presidential election the "tidelands controversy" had become quite
partisan.
The significance of this issue in determining the Eisenhower-Stevenson
Presidential election varies according to account. However, several important
points should be noted. The Republican party made their platform for the 1952
elections one of State's rights. 44 Eisenhower promised, if elected, to settle the
"tidelands controversy" by securing the necessary quitclaim legislation to return
authority and ownership over the submerged lands of the territorial sea to
coastal States. The Democratic candidate, Adalai Stevenson, on the other hand,
was steadfastly against such action.
The telling blow for Stevenson, in this respect, came when he announced
his position to then-Governor Shriver of Texas in August 1952. This
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announcement prompted Democrat Shriver to publicly issue a declaration of non-
support of Stevenson.45 The Republican party in Texas, traditionally a
Democratic stronghold, capitalized on Stevenson's announcement by placing all
of the State's Democratic nominees on the Republican ticket with Eisenhower-
Nixon as the Presidential pick to present Texan Democrats a straight ticket. 46
Further, Shriver publicly indicated his desires to place the Eisenhower-Nixon
ticket on the Texas Democratic ballot. A New York Times article of this period
noted the rising tide of Republicanism in Texas and attributed it to the desire in
Texas to make a clean sweep in Washington and to reclaim submerged lands that
were felt to appropriately belong to Texas.47 Similar expressions of the
importance of this issue to Louisiana, which in 1952 was receiving more that $25
million a year from offshore oil, were made by its Congressional
representatives.48
Eisenhower prevailed in the 1952 elections and went on to fulfill his
promise of restoring ownership of the submerged lands of the territorial sea to
the coastal States by orchestrating the Submerged Lands Act through Congress,
in May of 1953, four months after his election. That the "tidelands controversy"
was the deciding factor in this election is probably unascertainable; that the
issue was at least regionally influential is undeniable. Further, the issue was
quite partisan and may become so again if it rekindles with U.S. adoption of the
l Zn.rn, territorial sea. The issue then, as it would be now, can be expressed
largely in dollar signs.
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Congressional enactment of the SLA and OCSLA.
Within four months of his election President Eisenhower managed to
orchestrate passage through Congress of both quitclaim legislation for the
submerged lands of the territorial sea and authorizing legislation for Federal
mineral leasing on the outer continental shelf - an amazing feat given the long
and turbulent history of the "tidelands controversy." The Submerged Lands Act
(67 Stat 29), passed Congress by a 278-116 vote on May 14, 1953. In this vote the
Republicans overwhelming supported Eisenhower by a ratio of 184-17, whereas
the Democrats were fairly evenly split by a ratio of 94-98 in favor of the bill.
The vote on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act passed by only a slightly
more favorable margin.49 An interesting note on the passage of the SLA was the
charge by a Democrat that the vote was a Republican debt being paid to Texas
Governor Shriver who "repudiated" Stevenson, his own party's nominee in the
1952 election.50
Both pieces of legislation were needed at that time to promote the
development of offshore oil and establish revenue flow lines. In the Submerged
Lands Cases the Supreme Court had specifically referred to the Federal
government's interest in the territorial sea as that of "paramount rights,"
thereby leaving question as to ownership of the submerged lands therein.
Further, oil activities had moved beyond the territorial sea in the Gulf of Mexico
and, prior to the OCSLA, the Federal government possessed no leasing
framework for marine hydrocarbons or hard minerals.
The OCSLA also served to codify the earlier Truman Proclamation on the
Continental Shelf and incorporate U.S. jurisdiction over this area into domestic
law. The Truman Proclamations were of an extra-territorial nature, claiming
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not ownership but merely jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the OCS.
The OCSLA and Truman Proclamation were intended to establish jurisdiction
without setting undue international precedents for more extravagant claims. As
history has shown, however, this Proclamation did serve as the basis for
numerous claims on ocean space by other coastal nations.
Subsequent "tidelands" cases: legal interpretation of the SLA and Federal/State
authority over marine territory and resources.
Within Section 2 of the SLA, Congress defined the term "lands beneath
navigable waters," as, "...all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal
waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three
geographical (nautical) miles distant from the coast line of each State and to the
boundary line of each State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the
time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by
Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three
geographical miles•••"51 Congress did, however, retain its, "..•navigational
servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and
navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation,
national defense, and international affairs .•."52
This definitional test for "lands beneath navigable waters" was purposefully
left twofold in the Gulf of Mexico to accomodate Texas' claim to a 3 marine
league boundary. As will be indicated shortly the uncertainty of this definition
for seaward boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico led to several more Supreme Court
cases.
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•Shortly after passage of the Submerged Lands Act two cases were
instituted in the Supreme Court to challenge the law on the constitutional
grounds that Congress did not own the submerged lands and could, therefore, not
cede them to coastal States. These two cases were merged because of their
similar intent and decided by a joint decree of the Supreme Court in 1954. This
case was entitled Alabama v Texas: Rhode Island v Louisiana (347 U.S. 272).
- -
These cases were instituted on the grounds that it was unfair for certain Gulf
States to be granted greater seaward boundaries than other coastal States.
In the Alabama ~ Texas case, Alabama had assumed it would be granted
only 3n.m., and that Texas would be granted 3 marine leagues. Alabama wished
to assert that a larger submerged lands grant to Texas would violate the "equal
footing" doctrine. As one of the original thirteen colonies Rhode Island also put
the weight of its case on the "equal footing" doctrine. In its 1954 decision the
Supreme Court denied Alabama and Rhode Island leave to file their complaints.
As previously stated, the ambiguity of the Submerged Lands Act with
regard to seaward extension of boundaries into the Gulf of Mexico precipitated
these challenges to the SLA. This matter was eventually settled by the Supreme
Court in another consolidated case, in 1960. This action was initiated by the
Federal government to meet Louisiana's claim to submerged lands extending to
the edge of the continental shelf. After an interim agreement by Louisiana and
the U.S., setting the baseline from which Louisiana's claim would be projected
(the Chapman Line), and an amicus curiae brief filed by Texas, the Supreme
Court ordered the case broadened to include all coastal States bordering the Gulf
of Mexico.
This case, U.S. ~ States of Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama &. Florida
(No. 11 Original, October Term, 1957), was settled in 1960 (363 U.S. 1, 121).
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Ruling separately for Florida, the Supreme Court restricted all Gulf Coast States
to a 3n.m. submerged lands grant - except Texas and Florida on the Gulf Coast,
which were granted 3 marine leagues. This case was intended to settle the
"tidelands controversy." While it did serve to determine the extent of each Gulf
Coast State's submerged lands grant, it did not stop the controversy.
In the October 1974 term of the Supreme Court the Federal government
again invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine
whether the U.S. or the Atlantic Seaboard States had jurisdiction over the seabed
and natural resources of the continental shelf beyond 3n.m. (No. 35 Original,
decided March 17, 1975,95 S. Ct. 1155). The argument of the Atlantic States in
this case was not novel. These States argued that as successors to the original
thirteen colonies, and indirectly the Crown of England, they were entitled to this
area and resources. Basically, these States wished to reopen the case U.S. ~
California (No. 12 Original), upon the grounds that evidence in that case had
been inadequately presented. The Supreme Court it its decision on this case
rested on the doctrine of stare decisis (adherence to previous judicial
interpretation), to refuse to reopen the U.S. ~ California case and re-examine its
constitutional underpinnings. The Court further ruled that the Submerged Lands
Cases were "embraced" by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act and not
repudiated by it.
The final outcome of this series of post-SLA submerged lands cases left the
coastal States, with the previously described exceptions on the Gulf Coast of
Texas and Florida, with submerged lands grants of 3n.m. A wide variety of
related cases have been tried but these have primarily been concerned with the
placement of the coastal baseline along bays, harbors, and with ambulatory
coastlines.
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Conjecture can be made that with the history of the Submerged Lands
Cases, as described in this chapter, the coastal States of the U.S., and their
representatives, were left with a "sour taste in their mouths" as regards their
abilities to prevail in jurisdiction-related matters with the Federal government.
Rightly or wrongly, this feeling could serve as the spark for rekindling the
"tidelands controversy" should the U.S. assert its right to a l2n.m. territorial
sea. Coastal States would not, however, automatically gain jurisdiction over this
expanded territorial sea. The Submerged Lands Act and history of Supreme
Court decisions in this matter would necessitate positive Congressional action
for a change in jurisdictional limits to occur. For this reason some not unduly
large portion of this chapter has been devoted to presenting the political side of
the "tidelands controversy," as it could playa significant role in future domestic
sea law changes.
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Current Federal/State offshore jurisdictional disputes.
Jurisdiction can be split to be examined from both a territorial and
managerial perspective. The preceeding segments of this chapter have examined
the evolution of Federal/State territorial jurisdiction over the submerged lands
within the territorial sea. The remaining segment of this chapter will briefly
look at unresolved managerial jurisdictional problems within the territorial sea
and beyond as between coastal States and the Federal government. The purpose
of this review is to present further evidence indicative of the intergovernmental
tension over coastal and marine natural resource jurisdiction which may, in
addition to the manner in which territorial jurisdiction in this realm evolved,
precipitate coastal State interest in enhancing their position within an expanded
territorial sea. Beyond territorial control, coastal States have an interest in the
disposition of revenues derived by the Federal government from resource
development adjacent to their territory as much of the staging and support
activity for. this development will based within their boundaries. In order to plan
for and influence the ultimate timing and mode of this development coastal
States also desire assured input to related Federal decision-making. These two
aspects of managerial jurisdiction will be examined below.
Revenue flow from offshore hydrocarbon development.
SECTION 8(g) LITIGATION. Even after resolution of the seaward extent of
coastal State boundaries had been adjudicated problems remained. Due to the
artificial nature of political boundaries a problem arose concerning the
development of hydrocarbon resources from fields underlying the Federal/State
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offshore boundaries. Because of the relative magnitude of OCS development in
the Gulf of Mexico, as indicated in Chapter One, this examination focuses on
that region. However, it should be noted the States of California and Alaska are
pursuing litigation against the Federal government on grounds similar to those to
be described below.
When the OCS Lands Act was amended in 1978 a provision, Section 8(g) (43
USC 1337) was added establishing a 3n.m. buffer beyond presumed Federal/State
marine boundaries. Within this buffer the OCS Lands Act Amendments directs
the Secretary of the Interior to provide the Governor of the adjacent State an
opportunity to enter into an agreement for the "fair and equitable" division of
revenues from leases let by the Secretary. Further, the Secretary is directed to
determine whether any such areas subject to lease have oil or gas pools or fields
underlying both Federal and State waters. Section 8(g) is premised on the
likelihood that a hydrocarbon field could be split by the Federal/State boundary
and that development on one side of this boundary could deprive the other party
of resources rightfully theirs. Any revenues derived from an 8(g) lease is
deposited into an interest-bearing escrow account pending agreement as to its
disposition or until a judicial award is made. Section 8(g) litigation in the Gulf of
Mexico alone involves the disposition of over $2.5 billion.
Because of differing interpretations of the Section 8(g) term "fair and
equitable" division of revenues, the States of Texas,53 and Louisiana,54 have
filed lawsuits against the Secretary of the Interior in this matter. Both of these
cases were filed on July 27, 1979 and have yet to be resolved. These cases have
been initiated because the affected States felt that their interests (read
revenues), were being adversely affected by actions of the Federal government
adjacent to lands subject to their territorial jurisdiction.
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OCS REVENUE SHARING. In 1972, the U.S. Congress passed, and
President Nixon signed into law, P.L. 92-583 - the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). Enacted as a voluntary program, participating coastal States were
directed by the CZMA to plan and implement coastal management programs to
meet and ameliorate increasing developmental pressures. Pressures on the coast
have continued to mount in the 11 years since passage of the CZMA. The
increase can largely be attributed to demographic shifts to coastal areas,
expansion of coastal-dependent industries, and a dramatic increase increase in
exploration and development/production of hydrocarbons from offshore areas.
The CZMA was reauthorized and amended in 1976 to establish the Coastal
Energy Impact Program (CEIP) to assist coastal States and localities in planning
for and mitigating the impacts of energy development. The CEIP was proposed
by the Ford Administration as an alternative to a number of Congressional
initiatives designed to implement an OCS revenue-sharing mechanism. The
CZMA was also amended, in 1976, to require that States participating under the
CZMA plan for energy facility siting in the coastal zone.
During the reauthorization of the CZMA, in 1980, Congress further
amended the Act to provide incentives for coastal States to improve their
coastal management programs. An additional amendment expanded eligibility
for funding under CEIP to include activities related to coal transportation and
storage and ocean thermal energy conversion.
As may be obvious by the preceding synopsis, the CZMA, while providing
support for State coastal management planning, has gradually increased State
responsibilities. As these responsibilities have grown, so has coastal State
dependence on Federal funds provided to meet the objectives of the CZMA.
Though the funding for CZMA activities has always been intended to shift from
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the Federal to State governments, the Reagan Administration's policy of fiscal
restraint has accelerated this transition.
While a policy of fiscal restraint would dictate a decreasing State reliance
on Federal funding for CZMA activities, the phase-down comes at a time when
other Federal funding to States is also being curtailed. Further, in an effort to
decrease U.S. dependence on foreign energy supplies and, in part, to increase
revenues for the Federal Treasury, the Reagan Administration has concurrently
proposed a dramatically accelerated program of OCS hydrocarbon leasing.
To meet their coastal management and OCS review responsibilities, coastal
States are searching for alternative funding sources. One such alternative
currently being considered by Congress is OCS revenue sharing. In essence, OCS
revenue sharing would provide a mechanism through which coastal States would
receive a share of Federal revenues from OCS leasing and development.
Four bills were considered by the recently adjourned 97th Congress. These
four bills were: (1) H.R. 5543 - introduced into the House of Respresentatives on
February 22, 1982 by Congressmen Jones and D'Amours, with 52 Congressional
co-sponsors; (2) S. 2129 - introduced into the Senate on February 23, 1982 by
Senator Mitchell as a companion bill to H.R. 5543; (3) S. 2792 - which mustered
15 Senate co-sponsors, was introduced into the Senate on July 29, 1982 by
Senator Stevens; and (4) S. 2794 - introduced into the Senate on July 29, 1982 by
Senator Weicker. Hearings were held in the 97th Congress only on H.R. 5543 and
S. 2792; these two bills have received the most serious Congressional attention.
These four Congressional OCS revenue sharing bills shared several common
elements. In general, these bills would have provided that a portion of Federal
OCS revenues be utilized to fund selected coastal and ocean programs. Each bill
specifically addressed the Coastal Zone Management Program, the Sea Grant
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Program, coastal energy impact activities, and living marine resource programs.
These bills varied, however, in their strategy for program funding.
Shortly upon reconvening, both sides of the 98th Congress saw the
reintroduction of OCS revenue sharing bills. Floor action on these active bills is
anticipated by Summer 1983. The activity on OCS revenue sharing has not been
limited to the Congress. The President's Council on Natural Resources and the
Environment has also addressed this issue. Though hedging on its final
acceptance of any OCS revenue sharing measure the Reagan Administration has
been more supportive of those bills which would have the effect of limiting
coastal State interference in OCS leasing.
Coastal State input to Federal decision-making beyond the territorial sea.
Though the direct revenue interests of coastal States, beyond Section 8(g)
monies, ceases at the limit of their submerged lands grants, their interest in
Federal or Federally-sponsored hydrocarbon development on the OCS and
Federal fisheries management beyond the territorial sea does not.
CONSISTENCY. Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act, P.L.
92-583, was established as an inducement for coastal States to participate in the
voluntary Federal coastal zone management program. As enacted in 1972,
Section 307 provided that the following activities must be consistent with State
CZM programs that have received Federal approval: (1) Federal activities
"directly affecting" the coastal zone; (2) Federal development projects in the
coastal zone; and (3) private activities affecting coastal zone uses and requiring
Federal licenses or permits (Section 307(c)). Section 307(d) contains a similar
provision for State and local government activities receiving Federal assistance.
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The CZMA was amended in 1976 to provide, among other things, that OCS
lessees submit a consistency certification on exploration, development, and
production activities described in OCS plans for State review and concurrence.
If the State concurs with all the activities in the plan, the lessee would not
thereafter have to submit separate consistency certifications for each activity
that requires a Federal permit.
The OCS participation grants available under Section 308(c) of the CZMA,
established by the 1978 OCS Lands Act Amendments (P.L. 95-372), provided
funding to coastal States with Federally approved CZM programs, and allowed
them to carry out their responsibilities under the OCSLA.
A major question has emerged in the evolution of the consistency
provisions of the CZMA regarding the extent to which OCS leasing "directly
affects" the coastal zone. The issue is important because only Federal activities
that "directly affect" the coastal zone must be "consistent to the maximum
extent pr acticable" with approved State CZM programs. The 1976 amendments
to the CZMA clearly include post-lease activities as a category subject to
consistency review by coastal States, but the question of whether the pre-lease
activities of the Department of the Interior are subject to consistency
determinations was not clarified.
After the Department of Commerce made several attempts to resolve this
question through rule-making, it was turned over to the courts for final
adjudication. In 1981, a District Court in California ruled that the Department
of the Interior must prepare a consistency determination for OCS Lease Sale 53
(State of California et al. ~ James Watt, et aI., DCII CV 81-2080 MRPj C.D.
Cal., August 18, 1981). This initial ruling held that the lease sale "directly
affected" California's coastal zone. This decision was appealed by the
Department of Justice.
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On August 12, 1982 the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth
Circuit filed its ruling on this appeal (No. 81-5799; DCII CV 81-2080-MRP). In
upholding the lower court's earlier decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Department of the Interior violated Section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA by not
providing a consistency determination for Lease Sale 53. While the Court of
Appeals agreed that Lease Sale 53 did "directly affect" the California coastal
zone, it opened the question of the meaning of the phrase "consistent to the
maximum extent practicable." Following a failed attempt by representatives of
the State of California to reopen this case to clarify this phrase, the Department
of Justice decided to appeal the case to the Supreme Court where it now is
pending.
While establishing that the CZMA required a consistency determination for
Lease Sale 53, the Court of Appeals ruling did make clear that a coastal State
does not possess veto power over· Department of the Interior lease sale
activities. Perhaps because of the narrowness of the scope of the Court of
Appeals review, and of the ruling itself, questions exist regarding the relative
authority over OCS leasing beyond the submerged lands grants of coastal States.
The consistency issue has yet to be finally adjudicated but it has clearly been a
source of intergovernmental tension and dispute over managerial jurisdictional
authority.
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT.55 Due largely to foreign pressures on fish
stocks adjacent to the extant 12n.m. U.S. fisheries zone established by the
Bartlett Act, the Congress, in 1976, enacted the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA). The FCMA established a Fishery Conservation Zone
(FCZ) which extended from the seaward edge of the coastal States' boundaries to
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a line drawn 200n.m. from U.S. shores. Within the FCZ the Federal government
exerts exclusive jurisdiction to manage fishery resources by balancing both
resource conservation and promotion of the domestic fishing industry. Foreign
access to the FCZ is administered jointly by the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and U.S. Department of State under governing intergovernmental
fishing agreements with the home nations of foreign fishing fleets.
Within the FCZ the FCMA established a regionally-oriented management
scheme employing eight regional councils to prepare fishery management plans
for major fisheries under their jurisdicition. These regional councils are
composed of representatives from Federal and State governments, and private
industry. They receive technical assistance from NMFS and, subject to review
by the Secretary of Commerce, have their fishery management plans
implemented by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Within the U.S. territorial sea the coastal States retain complete
management and enforcement authority for commercial and recreational
fisheries. The FCMA does provide for Federal regulation of a commercial
fishery that is harvested predominantly within State waters, under limited
circumstances, but provides for resumption of State authority pending
adjustment of State management initiatives.
Before implementation of the FCMA State regulation of adjacent, offshore
fisheries was the rule. Enforcement of State fishery regulations was pursued
using the reserved police powers of the State, subject to constitutional
limitations, and implemented using at-sea patrol, landing laws, and fishing vessel
registration. Extention of State regulation to fisheries outside the territorial sea
was permitted if the State could prove its "interests" in this area and could
demonstrate that its regulatory efforts were enforceable.56
44
Following Federal adoption of the FCMA, however, coastal States were
preempted from pursuing their "interests" in extra-territorial fisheries
management except in the absence of Federal efforts to manage these resources,
or where the regional council, or Secretary of Commerce, had decided that no
positive Federal regulation was necessary. 57 State regulation would,
undoubtedly, have to be pursued within constitutional limits and be directed to
similar goals as the FCMA.
Numerous instances may occur where Federal action in fisheries
management within the FCZ may be felt by adjacent coastal States to be
adverse to their interests. Because of the preemptive effect of positive Federal
actions under the FCMA, however, coastal States will be prevented from
pursuing these interests outside of the regional councils.
As indicated in Chapter One, the majority of commercial fisheries are
conducted within l Zn.m, of U.S. shores. It is not, therefore, unlikely that in the
event that the U.S. extends its territorial sea coastal States would seek to
expand their fisheries jurisdiction even above and over efforts to expand their
territorial jurisdiction. Should such actions be successful the end result would
have most commercial fishing activity subject to State control.
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CHAPTER THREE
DOMESTIC ADVENT OF THE 12n.m. TERRITORIAL SEA
Conditional U.S. acceptance of the 12n.m. territorial sea.
As has been brought out in the first chapter of this study, the U.S., prior to
President Reagan's EEZ Proclamation, had only conditionally accepted the
12n.m. limit for coastal nation's territorial sea projections. President Nixon, in
his 1970 Ocean Policy Statement, made the first such promulgation. From this
point through the remainder of the UNCLOS III deliberations the U.S. maintained
that it would acquiesce to the l Zn.rn, territorial sea limit in exchange for
guarantees for unimpeded passage of surface, subsurface, and air ships through
straits used for international navigation. The reasoning behind this conditional
acceptance by the U.S. of the 12n.m. territorial sea was concisely put by Oxman
in his review of preparations for UNCLOS III. "No state can be expected to
agree to subject its communications with the rest of the world to the discretion
of another state, nor is it clear whether any state would in fact gain by the
acquistion of a discretionary right to interfere with transit of straits where the
exercise of that right would be a matter of such fundamental concern to so many
others."58
The use of the term "communications" can be viewed as an amalgamation
of U.S., and other nations', interests in commercial and military transportation.
Undue interference with commercial transportation could appreciably add to
monetary and temporal shipping costs. Interference with military movements
through critical straits, however, has likely been the potential outcome most
feared by the global powers from coastal nation extension of territorial seas in
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those areas which would completely cover straits used for international
navigation. Of course, the two global powers potentially most affected by
interference with military access to and through straits used for international
navigation are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, these two countries
pushed early on in the UNCLOS negotiations for provisions guaranteeing "free
transit" through such straits.59 Opponents of "free transit" preferred to rely on
the tenets of "innocent passage" as articulated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The difference in these two
positions was the relative weighting given "straits states" in imposing controls on
such passage. The compromise reached was that of non-suspendable "transit
passage" for the purpose of, "•..expeditious transit of the strait between one part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone•.•" subject to reasonable coastal nation regulation
for the purposes of safety and pollution control, and customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary law implementation.60 This compromise was for the
most part hammered out in the 1975 Geneva session of UNCLOS III.61
Continued U.S. opposition of coastal nations' extensions of a l Zn.rn,
territorial sea has, until recently, been pursued in lieu of successful completion
of UNCLOS III negotiations and the quid pro guo of the transit passage regime.
With the recent decision of the Reagan Administration to abandon the UNCLOS
Treaty, the ultimate global implementation of the transit passage regime
remains in doubt. As earlier pointed out, however, the growing acceptance of
the 12n.m. limit to territorial sea projections as an international custom
accorded members of the community of nations has increasingly precluded the
U.S. from expending its limited political capital in opposing such extentions.
This is, perhaps, the reason why U.S. recognition of the right of other coastal
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nations to a l Zn.rn, territorial sea was included in President Reagan's EEZ
Proclamation. From a global strategic perspective access to and through straits
used for international navigation will continue to decline in importance as the
range of weapon delivery systems of the naval fleets are technologically
extended. Further, in time of armed conflict it is difficult to imagine a global
power abiding by the strictures of lesser non-involved powers on its movements.
Without U.S. accession to the UNCLOS III Treaty bilaterally negotiatied access
should, in most cases, assure U.S. military and commercial interests of their
required routes.
As of this writing, this remains the official U.S. position regarding the
l Zn.m, territorial sea from an international perspective. International
customary acceptance of this limit together with the recent U.S. decision to
recognize the l Zn.rn, territorial sea claims of other coastal nations may force
reappraisal of U.S. opposition to domestic adoption of the l Zn.m, limit.
Previous efforts to generate a 12n.m. territorial sea in the U.S. - and the
bureaucratic response.
As the l Zn.rn, territorial sea achieves the stature of customary
international law, and as coastal nation adoption of this limit grows, the avenues
for domestic accession to this limit will increase. The basic premise of this
study is that with international acceptance and implementation of this limit to
seaward territorial projections the U.S. will eventually succumb to domestic
pressures, such as those described in Chapters One and Two, and incorporate the
l Zn.m, territorial sea into domestic law. Attempts to adopt this limit are not
new however. Several bills have, in the past, been introduced into the U.S.
Congress to do just this.
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Within the past 12 years at least three separate, relevant bills have been
introduced into the U.S. Congress for consideration. Each bill if not identical
was only marginally modified from its predecessor. These three bills - H.R.
5253, H.R. 1738, and H.R. 4374 were introduced into the 92nd, 93rd, and 94th
Congresses, respectively. All three bills were referred to the House Committee
on the Judiciary. Additionally, H.R. 4374 was referred to the House Committees
on Interior and Insular Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, perhaps reflecting the
growing cross-jurisdicitional interests of Congressional committees.
Given their striking similarity only the latest version, H.R. 4374 (94th
Congress), and the bureaucratic response to this bill will be examined here. The
purposes of this examination are twofold; examination of H.R. 4374 will serve
both to illustrate a likely model for related future bills and to portray the long
standing opposition of the Executive branch to initiatives which as an end result
represent a of diminution of its authority. A photocopy of H.R. 4374 is included
as an appendix to this study for the reader's consideration.
The most recent legislative initiative aimed at granting coastal states
within the U.S. mineral rights on the continental shelf to l Zn.m, was introduced
into the House of Representatives on March 6, 1975. Sponsored by Congressman
Eilberg (0.- Pa.), H.R. 4374 (94th Congress), was referred to the Committ~es on
the Judiciary, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. No action was
taken on this bill in the Foreign Affairs Committee and no hearings were
scheduled in either of the other two committees.
Within the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, H.R. 4374 was
referred to the Mines and Mining Subcommittee. The Subcommittee in turn
requested legislative comments from the Executive branch Departments of the
Interior, Commerce, and State. Unfavorable reports were filed with the
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Subcommittee by the Departments of the Interior and Commerce, and no report
was forthcoming from State.
The House Committee on the Judiciary referred H.R. 4374 to its
Subcommittee on Immigration. Legislative comments were requested by the
Subcommittee from the Departments of Defense, Interior, Justice, State, and
Treasury. Unfavorable reports were received from the Departments of Defense,
Interior, Justice, and Treasury. Again, no comments were issued by the State
Department. The positions taken by the reporting Departments on H.R. 4374 via
the request of both Subcommittees are summarized and itemized below.
Distillation of Executive Branch oppostion to H.R. 4374.
As with all other Executive branch testimony or legislative comments the
responses of the identified Departments were coordinated by the President's
Office of Management and Budget. It should not, therefore, be too much of a
suprise to identify some common elements among these responses. Each agency
will, of course, stress those elements of its oppostion which best serve its
purposes in the conduct of its mandate. With this in mind, a distillation of
Executive branch opposition to H.R. 4374 is presented below. Any future
legislative attempt to alter ownership of the submerged lands of the 3-12n.m.
zone will have to contend with most of these same detractions, and should be
drafted accordingly:
(l) The issue of ownership of submerged lands as between the coastal
States and the Federal government was appropriately settled by enactment of
the Submerged Lands Act and the OCS Lands Act;
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(2) The resources of the OCS are national resources and should be
administered for the benefit of the entire nation;
(3) Pressing U.S. energy needs dictate that OCS resources be used to solve
national problems;
(4) A substantial source of revenue to the U.S. Treasury would be
transferred to coastal States without an increase in their liabilities;
(5) By its imprecision, H.R. 4374 did not provide adequate protection for
portions of the OCS withdrawn by the President (e.g., marine sanctuaries), or by
the Executive branch for military purposes;
(6) Coastal State control of the 3-12n.m. zone could delay OCS
development and interfere with free market competitive forces;
(7) Extension of coastal State ownership of submerged lands would project
them into the field of international relations where they have no constitutional
business; and,
(8) Creation of the U.S. international boundary advisory commission would
be a constitutional infringement on the President's powers.
Department of the Interior. The Department of the Interior strongly
recommended against enactment of H.R. 4374. Noting its similarity to several
previous bills 001 stated that, "(i)t has been the firm position of the
Administration that the resources, and revenues from those resources, of the
Outer Continental Shelf are and should continue to be national assets,
administered to benefit all of the citizens of the United States. We reaffirm
that position•.••The Department believes that the question of ownership and
jurisdiction over the OCS has been appropriately settled by enactment .of the
Submerged Lands Act and the OCS Act and by various decisions of the courts.
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We know of no rationale for changing that settlement at this time." The
Department of the Interior's position on H.R. 4374 was conveyed by a letter from
then Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Kyl to Congressman Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., then chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary dated April
12, 1976.
Department of Defense. Beyond deferring to the views of the
Department of the Interior, in view of its mandate to implement the OCS Lands
Act, the Department of Defense had one primary grievance with H.R. 4374. The
"Engle Act," (43 USC 155-158), limits provisions of the OCS Lands Act by
allowing designation of National Defense Areas. This limitation requires a
specific act of Congress to approve withdrawl of parcels of "public lands"
exceeding 5,000 acres for use by the DOD. To circumvent this limitation DOD
and DOl have authorized agreements for theuse of selected areas on the OCS by
the military departments. The Department of Defense held that Section 4 of
H.R. 4374, did not give adequate protection to such OCS areas utilized by the
military under agreement with the Department of the Interior and only protected
those areas withdrawn as National Defense Areas by statute. The DOD held that
such protections were necessary to prevent selection of mineral exploitation
sites by various States which could present problems in: a) possible interference
with the use of military operating areas and testing sites such as missile ranges,
gun ranges, calibration ranges, acoustic ranges, etc.; b) dangers relating to
unexploded offshore ordnance; and, c) the fact that national energy resources, on
or offshore, must be defended in time of national emergency. The views of the
Department of Defense concerning H.R. 4374 were conveyed by letter from E.J.
Liebman, Acting Director of the Legislative Division of the Navy, to
Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., on April 15, 1976.
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Department of Commerce. As in the case of the Department of
Defense the Commerce Department deferred to the opinion of the Department
of the Interior for a full discussion of reasons for recommending against
enactment of H.R. 4374. Beyond this deferment, however, the Department of
Commerce noted that the pressing energy needs of the U.S. demanded that the
mineral resources of the OCS be used to solve national problems for the benefit
of the entire U.S. public. The status quo established by the Submerged Lands
Act and the OCS Lands Act was felt by the Department of Commerce to be
satisfactory and should, therefore, not be changed. The views of the Department
of Commerce on H.R. 4374 were detailed in a letter from John Thomas Smith II,
then General Counsel of the Commerce Department to Congressmen James A.
Haley, then Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
and Thomas E. Morgan, then Chairman of the House Committee on International
Relations, dated May 4, 1976.
Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury also
opposed enactment of H.R. 4374. This opposition was premised on the revenue
impacts of such an initiative, on its belief that the bill would delay OCS
development, and on the fact that H.R. 4374 would nullify previous Supreme
Court decisions which established ownership of the submerged lands beyond the
grants of the Submerged Lands Act.
Regarding revenue impacts of H.R. 4374 the Department of the Treasury
asserted that, "(emactrnent of this legislation would transfer substantial revenue
from the Federal Government to coastal State governments without sufficient
concomitant responsibilities or detriment on the part of the States. This is
particularly true in the case of areas where there is existing production such as
off the coast of California and in the Gulf of Mexico."
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The position of the Department of the Treasury regarding H.R. 4374 was
conveyed by letter from Richard R. Albrecht, then Treasury's General Counsel,
to Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., then Chairman of the Subcommittee on
International Resources, Food and Energy of the House Committee on
International Relations, on April 14, 1976.
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice expressed
"substantial" objection to H.R. 4374. The DOJ noted that the bill was drafted in
a quite imprecise manner and would result in questions regarding delineation of
Federal versus State authority in the 3-12n.m. zone. Further, the Justice
Department's legislative comments on H.R. 4374 pointed out that extension of
State authority beyond the limit of the extant territorial sea would place the
States in the realm of international relations where they had no constitutional
interests. Remaining objections to H.R. 4374 expressed by the Department of
Justice in its legislative comments were: a) that until lateral seaward
boundaries between coastal States were settled their extension would be
impossible and could interfere with resource development in the zone in
question; b) that this bill would have created the possibility of greater State
control over regulation of conservation (read oil production), which could affect
oil prices by creating artificial shortages or over supply, i.e., it would affect the
domestic free market system; c) that the bill, by creating a committee to
establish baselines from which to project the territorial sea, would duplicate
work previously conducted by an interdepartmental study group; d) that
provisions on withdrawl of areas within the 3-12n.m. zone and the inapplicability
of State control therein were unclear; e) that transfer of the submerged lands in
question would unjustifiably shift revenues from the U.S. Treasury to the coastal
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State; and, f) that Section 5 of this bill, by creating an advisory commission to
consult with Canada and Mexico on shared, disputed maritime boundaries, would
infringe unconstitutionally on the President's external relations powers.
The legislative comments submitted by the Justice Department on H.R.
4374 were easily the most thorough and articulate of all responding Executive
branch departments. This response was made in a letter sent by Michael M.
Uhlmann, then Assistant Attorney General, to Congressman Peter W. Rodino,
Jr ,, then Chairman of the House committee on the Judiciary, dated April 26,
1976.
Compendium of legislation requiring amendment for Ll.S, adoption of a 12n.m.
territorial sea.
Much of the first two chapters of this study was concerned with political
impediments to U.S. adoption of a l Zn.m, territorial sea. This section will
identify legal impediments to such an initiative. Though important, these legal
impediments are easily surmountable if the political will is mustered. Most
current U.S. statutes which would hinder or prevent U.S. adoption of a 12n.m.
territorial sea have provisions premised on the Submerged Lands Act and,
therefore, amendment of this Act is fundamental to progress in this regard.
Though Congressional enactment of a bill to grant coastal States the submerged
lands in the 3-12n.m. zone would overturn numerous, previous judicial decisions,
such an initiative would be similar to Congressional enactment of the Submerged
Lands Act itself.
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Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301-1315):
Title I, Section 2(b) provides the definition, in the SLA, of the submerged
lands grants to coastal States. This section, and references to it (e.g., Title II,
Section 4), would have to be amended for coastal State gains from U.S.
generation of a 12n.m. territorial sea. Section 2(b) limits these grants by
asserting that, ".••in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or the term 'lands
beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as extending from the coast line more
than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or
more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico."
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331-1356):
The OCS Lands Act was enacted pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act to
provide the Federal government with jurisdiction and mineral leasing authority
over the submerged lands of the OCS beyond State control. Section 2(a) of this
Act defines the OCS as, "...all submerged lands lying seaward and outside the
area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in Section 2 of the Submerged
Lands Act••., and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." The term "coastal zone" is
defined by the OCS Lands Act, in Section 2(e), as extending seaward to the outer
limit of the U.S. territorial sea. It should be noted here that much of the
statutory language in the OCS Lands Act applicable to coastal States refers to
the "coastal zone" as defined above. Should the U.S. adopt a l Zn.m. territorial
sea the "coastal zone," if strictly interpreted according to this statute, would
automatically extend to the 12n.m. limit - even though the submerged lands
granted coastal States would not. To bring the OCS Lands Act into accord with
an extended territorial sea, Section 2(a), and references to it, would have to be
amended.
56
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1401-1444;
16 U.S.C. 1431-1434):
Title I, Section 10l(a) of the MPRSA subjects ocean dumping by U.S.
national to Federal permitting procedures for all ocean waters. Title I, Section
10 Hb), restricts foreign vessels from dumping any materials into the territorial
sea and contiguous zone of the U.S. unless they have first obtained a permit from
the Federal government. Title III, Section 302(b), of the MPRSA provides that
Governors of affected States may withold certification of approval for a Federal
marine sanctuary designation which encompasses waters within their seaward
boundaries, as defined by the Submerged Lands Act.
A change in the territorial sea limit would apply to Sections lOl(b) and
302(b). Ocean dumping by foreign national would automatically be controlled in
an extended territorial sea and contiguous zone, however, amendment of the
Submerged Lands Act would be necessary to extend coastal State Governor's
authority over Federal marine sanctuary designations.
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451-1464):
Section 304(a) of the CZMA defines the "coastal zone" as, "••.the coastal
waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands
(including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other
and in proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal States, and includes
transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. The zone
extends, in the Great Lakes waters, to the international boundary between the
United States and Canada and, in other areas, seaward to the outer limit of the
United States territorial sea..• Excluded from the coastal zone are lands the use
of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by
57
the Federal Government, its officers or agents." This last sentence in the CZMA
definition of the "coastal zone" would appear to preclude automatic extension of
the coastal zone beyond the Submerged Lands Act grants to coastal States should
the U.S. extend its territorial sea. The OCS, defined by Section 2(a) of the OCS
Lands Act, is that area beyond the Submerged Lands Act grants to coastal
States, and which is held in trust by the Federal government for the American
public (Section 3(3».
The Coastal Zone Management Act presents a potential interpretational
conflict in the event of U.S. extention of its territorial sea. This conflict arises
because of the CZMA's Section 304(a) reliance on aligning the definition of the
coastal zone with the territorial sea instead of the submerged lands grants of the
coastal States. As expressed above, however, unless amended the reservation in
the Section 304(a) definition regarding areas held in trust by the Federal
government would seem to preclude automatic extension of the coastal zone
over areas of the OCS.
Deep Water Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501-1524):
Section 3(10) of the DWPA defines deepwater ports as a port or terminal
used for moving petroleum products and which is situated beyond the territorial
sea. Section 9 of this Act provides States within 15 miles of a proposed
deepwater port possess veto power over the project if it is not consistent with
that State's coastal zone management program. This section also applies to
coastal States with satisfactorily developing CZM programs.
Expansion of coastal States submerged lands grants could place proposed
projects, such as the Texas Offshore Port, under direct State control and, subject
others situated further out on the OCS to closer scrutiny by coastal States under
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the consistency provisions of the CZMA. Should legislation be drafted to expand
State lands within a l Zn.rn, territorial sea provision would have to be made for
existing deepwater ports, such as the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, to ensure that
all previous arrangements with the Federal government would be honored.
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.):
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), established the
authority of the Federal government to regulate the commercial take of
fisheries in waters beyond State control. Section 101 and 306 of the FCMA
delimits the inner boundary of the fishery conservation zone (FCZ) as a line
conterminous with the seaward boundary of coastal States and extending to a
line drawn 200n.m. from U.S. shores. The inner boundary of the FCZ, therefore,
would only be subject to change if coastal State seaward boundaries were
extended and not solely because of U.S. expansion of the territorial sea. As
indicated in Chapter One of this study, however, extension of coastal State
seaward boundaries would bring a predominant portion of U.S. commercial
fisheries under the sole managerial control of those States.
Summary. It seems clear that from examining the above referenced U.S.
statutes, which are the major statutes affecting State versus Federal control of
offshore waters and submerged lands, U.S. adoption of a l Zn.m, territorial sea
would not automatically extend coastal State's seaward boundaries. Expansion of
these boundaries would require positive Congressional action similar to that
undertaken in enacting the Submerged Lands Act. Since most relevant statutes
enacted subsequent to the SLA, with several confusing exceptions, are premised
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on this Act, its amendment would definitely be required to expand State
offshore authority. Further, amendment should be made to several statutes,
such as the OCS Lands Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, to clarify the
application of their jurisdictional limits to State offshore authority as being that
conferred on them by the Submerged Lands Act.
The statutes discussed above, though the major ones with regard to the
division between coastal State and Federal offshore jurisdiction, are not the only
ones which would be affected by either an expansion of the U.S. territorial sea
and/or coastal State's submerged lands grants. The remaining statutes, however,
would have a lesser effect if their jurisdictional limits were changed.
Congressional study prior to any change in the status of the territorial sea or
submerged lands grants should identify these lesser statutes and quantify the
effect of changes in their jurisdictional application.
Relative merits of different jurisdictional divisions of a hypothetical 12n.m.
territorial sea.62
For the purposes of this section a hypothesis is made that the U.S. will, in
time, acquiesce to domestic and international pressures and adopt a l Zn.rn,
territorial sea. In this event the question will arise as to how jurisdiction over
the 3-l2n.m. zone will be apportioned, if at all, between the Federal government
and coastal States. The preceeding discussion has made clear that in the absence
of positive Congressional action change in the territorial sea's limit will not
automatically assure change in coastal State's seaward boundaries.
It is assumed, herein, that with U.S. adoption of a l Zn.rn, territorial sea the
alternatives for domestic jurisdicitional apportionment of the 3-l2n.m. zone will
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be: (1) Federal control; (2) State control; (3) a division of this zone between the
two levels of government; or, (4) compensation, monetary or managerial, to
State governments with Federal jurisdiction maintained over this zone. Each of
these alternatives will be briefly addressed below.
Federal control over an expanded territorial sea.
In light of the substantial revenues which accrue to the Federal
government from resource exploitation beyond the territorial sea, significant
Executive branch opposition to attempts to diminish Federal control in this area
can be expected. To adequately assess the magnitude of this opposition careful
quantification of the existing and projected revenues from the 3-12n.m. zone
should be made. The lion's share of these revenues will come from offshore oil
and gas activity leasing and royalties and, accordingly, quantification of the
submerged hydrocarbon fields in this area and their value will present a good
first order of magnitude assessment.
The arguments for Federal control in this zone can be expected to be based
on the fact that at present these resources are contained in public lands and
benefits should accrue to the public as a whole and not solely to coastal States.
Further, inertia can be expected to playa role in Executive branch opposition to
gains in coastal State authority under an expanded territorial sea. As did the
States prior to enactment of the Submerged Lands Act, the Federal government
will likely argue that organizationally and financially it would be the most
efficient trustee of this zone. Because of the existing arrangements regarding
management authority in this zone the Federal government has, in place, the
organizational capacity to administer this zone and the financial resources to
achieve its objectives without significant change.
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It should be noted, however, that Federal assertion of complete control
over an expanded territorial sea will accrue significant domestic political costs.
These costs, addressed in Chapter Two of this study, and their magnitude will not
easily be discounted.
State control over an expanded territorial sea.
As discussed in preceeding chapters of this study, it should be expected
that coastal States and their representatives will attempt to assert control over
the area under an expanded territorial sea. In many ways this will be tantamount
to a rekindling of the "tidelands controversy" with all of its attendant turmoil.
This will be particularly true for those States which stand to benefit the most
from expansion of seaward State control. At present, the States that would be
most vocal on asserting State control would be Louisiana, Texas, California, and
Alaska - the States with current oil and gas activity off their shores. Though not
without its positive effects on coastal State economies, through job formation
and taxation of locally sited, related industries, offshore oil and gas does
contribute negatively to such States through environmental degradation and
stress on their social services infrastructure and, with the imminent demise of
the Coastal Enegy Impact Program instituted under the CZMA, such an argument
is not without its merits.
Complete State control over an expanded territorial sea, however, would
also convey significant costs to the affected States. These costs would be
composed of the additional management (Le., regulatory,
compliance/enforcement, and organizational) responsibilities that the affected
States would have to shoulder in administering gains under an expanded
territorial sea. For those coastal States with little to gain from resource
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exploitation in this 3-12n.m. zone the costs might outweigh potential revenue
benefits. This is not to say, however, that from a purely legal standpoint those
States may not wish to exert control over existing and potential activities
therein.
In addition to the expected Federal opposition to complete State control
over an expanded territorial sea, some degree of opposition may be expected
from the offshore industries most immediately affected. As with any change,
the severing of established relationships and expectations adds a certain degree
of uncertainty to planning efforts. In the absence of assurances to the contrary,
offshore industries might encounter operating conditions less to their liking or,
at the least, conditions which could vary regionally, if not State by State.
Provisions would have to be made for existing offshore leases, renewal rights,
and operating conditions in the event of any change from the status quo.
Division of an expanded territorial sea.
Any number of permutations for the functional or spatial division of an
expanded territorial sea between the Federal government and coastal States are
possible in the event of a compromise between their relative positions. This
discussion will deal with such an outcome generically.
In a worst case scenario the Federal government and coastal States would
assume mutually exclusive demands for control over an expanded territorial sea.
In many negotiations compromise is often the less costly alternative, in terms of
time, money, and political damage, to steadfast resolve of one's position.
Depending on the political magnitude of a rekindled "tidelands controversy"
compromise may appear to be the most viable solution to the disputants.
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For reasons addressed above, the coastal States can be expected to adopt
varying attitudes regarding the acceptability of a compromise on jurisdictional
authority over an expanded territorial sea. As in the evalutation of any
compromise each party will assess its particular benefit/cost value and negotiate
accordingly. While compromise in this regard would lower management costs to
coastal States, so would it lower existing and potential benefits to be gained
from exclusive resource jurisdiction.
An additional possibility in any compromise over division of an expanded
territorial sea would be to deal with this zone as a zone sui generis - a unique
situation, in which the relative costs and benefits would be divided between
coastal States and the Federal government. A potential outc;ome of such a
compromise could be a form of regional management akin to that set up for
fisheries management under the FCMA. To be a realistic option regional
management must be conducted under conditions where the parties involved deal
with each other from bases of relatively equal power. As with other options for
administering a divided, expanded territorial sea the attractiveness of this option
will be determined by the perceived costs and benefits it will accrue to the
participants. In light of continuing efforts to readjust the contemporary notions
of federalism, shared jurisdiction in this zone is an attractive possibility.63
Federal contol over an expanded territorial sea with compensation to coastal
States.
The last option for resolution of jurisdiction over an expanded territorial
sea to be evaluated in this section is retention of "ownership" of the 3-12n.m.
zone by the Federal government with some form of compensation to coastal
States. The outcome most easily envisioned under this option would be a
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graduated revenue sharing scheme. Without getting into the numerous
permutations on percentages of such a graduated revenue sharing scheme, this
alternative would be employed to present coastal States with an attractive
source of income while retaining the jurisdiction of the Federal government over
an expanded territorial sea.
As an alternative to a long drawn-out legal-political battle in the rekindled
"tidelands controversy" this option can be seen to create the least disruption of
the status quo by maintaining existing management responsibilities as between
the Federal government and coastal States and yet providing incentives to these
States in the form of allocated revenues. Indeed, as previously mentioned, with
the imminent demise of both the Coastal Zone Management Program and its
Coastal Energy Impact Program, there exist few incentives for coastal States to
allocate already scarce budgetary resources to properly address coastal planning
and onshore impacts of offshore resource exploitation activities - responsibilities
that Congress has numerous times declared to be in the national interest. In
fact, in the case of a perceived negative benefit/cost assessment of these
activities it is not unrealistic to envision coastal State legal impedance of these
offshore activities.
A graduated revenue sharing scheme for administration of an expanded
U.S. territorial sea would recognize the relative interests of both the Federal
government and coastal States in offshore areas and could serve as a mechanism
for maintaining reasoned management of coastal and territorial sea resources by
preserving the ability of States to fund related programs. The merits of revenue
sharing from offshore resource exploitation will be addressed further in the
following section of this study.
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Des revenue sharing and resolution of the 12n.m. territorial sea dilemma.
Having reviewed the relative merits of the potential division of an
expanded territorial sea as between coastal States and the Federal government,
and it light of the political polarization - as described in Chapter Two, likely to
result from consideration of this issue, compromise among opposing factions may
appear to be an attractive alternative. It will be, of course, important to
examine the "operating environment" in which debate over an expanded
territorial sea wiJI occur. Debate on this potential issue could be polarized or
muted by several factors. The economic health of the Nation will play a
substantial role in determining the outcome of this debate. The Federal
government and coastal States would both loathe yielding easily to any loss of
potential revenue in the face of budget deficits and severe personnel and
program reductions. Additionally, if the call for a revitalized federalism
maintains its current appeal or gains real substance it may contribute favorably
to a compromise in the resolution of this issue.
Over a period of 10-12 years the Congress has attempted to develop the
abilities of coastal States to both manage their coastal regions and to participate
in federally sponsored OCS development. The statutory vehicles for these
abilities have been provided by enactment of the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972 and the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978. Through monies and
authorities these Acts conferred on coastal States the framework for substantive
input to coastal planning and OCS leasing. The authorities so conferred have had
a more sustained history than have the monies.
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The previously mentioned Coastal Energy Impact Program was mandated
by Congress in its 1976 amendments to the CZMA to assist coastal States in
meeting the onshore negative impacts generated by an accelerated OCS leasing
schedule. This accelerated schedule had been initiated to reduce U.S.
dependence on imported sources of hydrocarbons whose interruption could
adversely affect national security and, as has subsequently been witnessed, the
national economy. The CEIP was enacted as an Executive branch substitute to
several measures being sponsored in Congress to establish as OCS revenue
sharing fund. 64 The CEIP was empowered to meet its objectives through
establishment of a Coastal Energy Impact Fund from which monies were
apportioned to coastal States in a variety of fashions. This was intended to
facilitate coastal State abilities to plan for, mitigate, and remedy coastally-
related energy impacts.
In amending the OCS Lands Act, in 1978, Congress conferred upon coastal
States the ability to participate in federally sponsored OCS leasing by providing
"participation grants" to help establish the requisite State organizational
abilities and by providing that Federal decision making which "directly affected"
the coastal zone of a State with an approved, or satisfactorally developing, CZM
program be consistent to the "maximum extent practicable" with that program.
This amendment was to have far reaching, and as of yet, unrealized potential.
Further, these amendments established a framework for formalizing State input
to OCS-related decision making at the Federal level.
During the tenure of the Reagan Administration, however, the expectations
that these two statutes have conveyed to coastal States have been changing.
Monies available under the CZMA, scheduled for a phase-out in 1985, have been
drastically reduced - particularly the CEIP. While Congress has partially
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buffered the immediacy of these program terminations by maintaining lowered
appropriations the end result will probably come before 1985.
Additionally, under the Reagan Administration virtually the entire OCS is
being offered for lease. This dramatic acceleration of OCS leasing juxtaposed
with reduced Federal funding of coastal planning has created a significant
controversy among concerned parties. Though the consistency power conferred
on coastal States is still being employed by these States to meet selected
objectives in coastal planning, its range and magnitude of authority is still being
judicially determined.
This OCS development-coastal planning controversy has been fueled by
similar program termination initiatives of the Reagan Administration in other
marine and coastal program areas including fisheries preservation and
development and the National Sea Grant Program. In turn, this controversy has
resurrected Congressional efforts to institute an OCS revenue sharing fund. The
97th Congress came very close to enacting such a fund and has under
reconsideration identical measures in the 98th Congress. Basically, though
allocation formulas vary, an OCS revenue sharing fund would be designed to
compensate coastal States for onshore impacts of offshore hydrocarbon
development and to assist them in other marine and coastal planning efforts. In
skeletal form these OCS revenue sharing initiatives would attempt to provide: (1)
equity in revenue sharing from development activities on Federal lands for
coastal States similar to that enjoyed by inland States, while accounting for
inherent differences; (2) recognition and assistance to coastal States in meeting
negative onshore impacts of OCS development; and, (3) recognition, and
accordingly funding for, maintenance of the national interest in a variety of
marine and coastal programs instituted over the past decade.65
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Whatever its final form, support for some mechanism for sharing federally
derived OCS revenues with coastal States is widespread outside of the Executive
branch. The current House vehicle's (H.R. 5 - 98th Congress) predecessor in the
97th Congress, H.R. 4597, passed late in the second session by a substantial
margin of 260 to 134, with 56 Congressional co-sponsors. A similar bill in the
Senate received similar widespread support but was not voted on by the end of
the 97th Congress. Nearly identical bills are being considered by the 98th
Congress and hearings are currently being conducted by both Houses of Congress.
Enactment of an OCS revenue sharing fund will likely predate
consideration of an expanded territorial sea. However, in considering alternative
divisions of an expanded territorial sea it is not improbable that a re-weighing of
the relative interests of the Federal government and coastal States in the 3-
l Zn.rn, zone could include adjustment of any established revenue sharing system.
One possible outcome of such a re-weighing of interests could be a graduated
revenue sharing scheme. It will be necessary for Congress to articulate these
relative interests - precisely, before any graduated revenue sharing formula could
realistically be devised.
Ultimate resolution of both of these issues would foster, not hinder, efforts
to develop the offshore resources of the U.S. and serve to revitalize coastal
federalism. A great deal of political teeth-gnashing can be expected before
their resolution but the end result could firm up intergovernmental marine
affairs and establish the framework for a more rationalized approach to ocean
and coastal policy formulation.
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CONCLUSION
This study was directed to examining the domestic impact of U.S. adoption
of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit. In so doing the history and current
status of limits to the territorial sea, the evolution of jurisdictional authority
between the Federal government and coastal States within this zone, and the
impediments to, and alternative division of, an expanded territorial sea were
examined.
In light of the recent U.S. Executive branch decision to recognize
international territorial sea claims up to l Zn.m.; the central premise of this
paper has been that domestic pressures will force the U.S. to accede to this
customary, internationally recognized limit. To meet this alteration of seaward
territorial limits it will be critical to assess the impacts of its adoption in the
U.S. Such an assessment should be composed of at least three elements. These
elements are the political impact on decision makers, the concomitant revenue
shifts of revised ownership of the mineral rights in the 3-12 nautical mile zone,
and the legal impediments to any alteration of the U.S. territorial sea. This
paper has briefly reviewed these three elements.
With this assessment in hand decision makers at both the Federal and State
levels of government will be better prepared to evaluate the relative merits of
alternative divisions of the expanded territorial sea as between themselves.
Four alternative divisions of the 3-12 nautical mile zone emanating from an
expanded territorial sea were identified in this study and, a cursory review was
made of their relative merits. The alternatives identified were: (0 Federal
control; (2) State control; (3) division of jurisdiction; and, (4) Federal control
with compensation made to coastal States.
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In light of the drastic reductions in many coastal and marine program areas
made under the current Administration, the incorporation of a graduated OCS
revenue sharing scheme was identified as a possible solution to the division of an
expanded territorial sea. The assumption was made that due to the political
volatility of a rekindled "tidelands controversy" negotiation and compromise
between polarized factions involved in the debate (l.e., the Federal government
and coastal State representatives), could appear to be a viable, and expedient
solution. A potential compromise identified herein, though certainly not the
only solution, was retention of Federal control in the 3-12 nautical mile zone
with compensation to coastal States in the form of a graduated offshore revenue
sharing system. Such a system would require the least disruption of the status
quo while yet recognizing the relative interests of both parties in an expanded
territorial sea and, likely be the least costly from a monetary, temporal, and
political perspective.
The advent of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea has been brought about
by the UNCLOS III negotiations. Now that the U.S. has, at least for the present,
indicated its refusal to become party to the UNCLOS III Treaty, U.S. ocean
policy formulators should begin to assess those UNCLOS III provisions which are
most easily implementable. Together with the 200 nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone Proclamation recently issued by President Reagan, U.S. adoption
of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea will provide the over-all framework for a
re-examination of U.S. ocean policy and federalism in the coastal zone.
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1ST SJ::SSIOX 1~. •
IX THE HOLSE OF TIEPHESEXTA..TIYES
)IARCH 6, 1£l75
~Ir. EILBJ:r:a introduced the following bill j which was referred to . the COIll-
mitrecs on the .Iudiciury, Lnt eri or and Lnsuln r Afiu irs, and Foreign Afl'a irs .
A BILL
"
To grant to each coastal State mineral rights In the subsoil an'a
seabed of the Outer Contiueu tal Shelf extenrlinz to a line
. 0
which is twelve miles from the coast of such' Stute, and for
other pm'poses.
1 Be it enacted b!J the Senate aiul Ilo7lse of Iieprescutu-
2 ticcs of the United States of Ame/'ica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTIOX 1. The Tuitcd States grants to each State
4 whose coastline borders on the A tlan tic or Pacific Ocean
;] or the Gulf of :JIexico all mineral rig-h ts held by the T nited
W J::
G Stutes in the subsoil and seabed in such ocean or gnlf out tu .
7 a line which is twelve miles from the base line established
8 pursuant to section 3.
9 SEC.~. (a) Xo grant to a Stlte shall tnke effett under
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..
1 section 1 unless the State files with the Senebry of the
2 Interior notificutiou of acccptuncc of such gmllt mid an
3 agreement tu take such grant subject to-
4 . (1) ?I1Y "Iense ' (illduoillg righ ts of renewal and
:=..:."'._ ~..~ =="i-. : ~ ; ~,.;.O •... _.
5 other rights) recoguized by the United States on the
6 date of enactment of this Act; find
7 , . (2) such regubtiQns with respect to the manage-
~ . ~ : 1 . Ii ;' . - I - • ' ! ! : . : . ~ .' ' .
8 ment of the rights granted as are established by the Sec-
-9" , retary of the Interior asnecessary for the protection of
~ ! ~ s» 1 , : • • -
10 the public health and welfare and safety, including rea-
11 sonable provisions for the conserva tion of nn tural rc-
12 sources. .... ...
.. ..-
• _ . - ... _ _ 0 ' . ~ • ."
13 1Jpon compliance' with this subsection, the Sta te shall take
I " I:
14 , the place-of the ~nited States with respect to any lease or
15 rights referred to in paragraph (1).
IG (b) Upon compliance with subsection' (0.) of any State,
17 the Secretary' of tb~ I~terior 'shall pay to such State all in-
18 come ree:ei,:ed by the Lnited States with respect to minerai
19 'r igh t ~~(gTa ll t e d "to such ' State pnrsunnt to this Act for the
.. \') ,. ' . , . . .
20 I)criod from 'the date of enactment of this Act until the date
2~'; "6i1 whi~h '~llc:h State complies with subsection (a).
22 ';;;. , SEC. '3.' For the purpose of determining the extent of
, ".' '. I.. . .! . '
23 'the 'gi'nnf pursuant to this Act, the Secretary of the Lntcrior
24 shall establish n coastal bnscline along the coasts of the Tuited
. , .
25 ':'Statcs'; alter 'C~il:-;lllt;ltioY4with the Secretary of State, the
12
3
4
3
Secretary of Delouse, the Attorney General, and :JpI)'rLlIll'intc
officials o~ the coastal Sta tes, in accordance with the ' prin-
, .
ciples established in the Conven tion on the .'I'crritorial Sea
. .
and the Contiguous Zone as' adopted at the Law of the Sea
5 Conference at Geneva, 'April 27, 1958:'1!I !;' .... ; :: ; :1 ' 'i
6 . ' SEC. 4. Section 1 sh;l1 not apply "7ith respect t~ 'mineral
, ,
7 rights in any ar~n' restricted from explorntion [1n(1 op01intion
8 . linder section 12 [d ) of the Outer Continental Shelf 'Lauds
9 Art (-tD U.S.C. 1:1-+1«1)), relating to nritioriril t delensc
10 areas. ~ • ; i : J I' ': ., . r -: r ~ ; • I I r
. . .
11 SEC. 5. The Congress hereby consents ' until Julv i,
~
12 1976, to [my agreement between flny two coastal Sth-:-tcs for
]~ the pnrpose of establishing the'locution of the mntualbound-
1.1 arv between such States cxt~nding ~ca\Yan] from \ the coast
15 of such Sta tcs, . ~ " ." '. ~ .,' :
IG SEC.' 6. (a) There' is established a boundary I rldYisor}'
11 commission to lye composed of two ~[el1lbers of the':1?niteel
18 States Senate, appointed by the Prcsirlcnt pro tempore of
19 the Senate, three 'JIellllJers of the Triitcd States House of
~o Iicprcscntn tives appointed hy the Speaker of the House, and
21 one representative each from the Departments of State,
C)<) Jm-tier, Dclcnso, nnd Interior, aud three other nu-mbers,
~:1 cnr-h nppointed hy the Pr.-sid.-u t. 1'11(\ Conllll is:-;ioll ~lt:tll
2.1 consult with the n()\'('rllll)rnt~ of C;1l1;Hl:1 :1\1<1 'J[CXil'O awl
41 year alter the lbtl' of ~nn('tllll'llt of this Act, with respect to
~' the mutual boundary extending seaward from the coast
3 between "each such country and the United States. ; ; ' !
4 ' ". (0)' Members of the advisory commission who are not
5 regular full-time -employees "of the United States shall, while
6 serving on business of the advisory commission, be entitled
7 .to receive compensation at ra tes fixed by the Prcsiden t, but
S not in excess of $100 pp,r (by, in('lnding traveltime. While
" 9 so serving n'\\ay from their linmcs or regular places of busi-
10 ness, such members 511:111 he allowed. travel expenses, includ-
11 :ing per diem in .lien of subsistence, as authorized ,hy section
J2 5703 of title 5 of the United States Code,for persons In
1~ Government sen-ice employed intermittently.
14 ' ,(c) The advisory commission is authorized, without
15 regard to the civil service In ws, to engage persons Ior such
16 'technical assistance 'as may be required ' to carry out its
17 functions. ' f '
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